THE suggested amendment to the National Security Council Act of 2016 to return the power of declaring security areas to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is a most welcome one in the spirit of checks and balances.
This amendment was, in fact, our original stance when the bill was first debated in Parliament in 2015. Even then, we had already stressed that the prime minister should not be the sole authority to declare security areas. We should remember that the original National Security Council Act did not receive a royal assent when it was first proposed.
In the wider context of the issue, it is important for us to also deliberate on the real role of the National Security Council (NSC). In these deliberations, I hope that we are able to take an enduring bipartisan approach.
It is hoped that this amendment will serve as a basis for other reforms to the NSC, mainly in the conduct of its primary duties not merely as a secretariat, but as a body that articulates a common national security strategy and policy, as well as a coordinator of the activities of other security elements along that common strategy and policy.
This is, in fact, the norm in other countries. In Japan, for example, a security council was established in 2013 by former prime minister Shinzo Abe to replace an older model that was deemed too inefficient and ineffective, especially at a time where Japan’s security environment was becoming increasingly complicated.
Similarly, Australia established a National Security Committee of the Cabinet in 1996. This committee was composed of not only the defence and home secretaries, but also the treasurer and finance minister, too.
These bodies usually hold sessions every week, and articulate national security policy via the publication of defence white papers and other coordinating activities such as intelligence fusion. In my view, this should be normalised here with our own NSC.
As it stands, our NSC’s performance leaves much to be desired. We can see for ourselves just how much is left wanting from the Auditor-General’s Report Series 3 in 2018, Chapter Six, which is dedicated to all federal government activities in maritime zone security. The following excerpt from the report’s executive summary proves to be quite illustrative:
“As a whole, the agencies and departments responsible for the security activities and enforcement in Malaysia’s maritime zone have performed their duties based on established standard operating procedures. However, these activities have yet to achieve an optimum level of efficiency due to coordination gaps between enforcement agencies and departments, due to a lack of intelligence-sharing and lack of assets.”
This summary puts the critical issues quite succinctly. Firstly, it establishes clearly that there is an understanding of national security that is too conventional and static. Furthermore, the sundry of operational issues suggests a lack of a common national security strategy and policy that effectively incorporate the various ministries and agencies into a single mission or objective. This, in turn, describes a rather reactive NSC, not a proactive one.
In this day and age, we can no longer limit our understanding of national security to the archetypical threats of old. The Covid-19 pandemic is a good example of this; it is the single greatest threat to human security in our time, compromising the ability of the rakyat to live normally and engendering great uncertainty and anxiety, in addition to being a very lethal biological force. We have to learn from this crisis and seriously rethink our conception of national security to be more dynamic and holistic.
Before the pandemic, the “sidang” of the NSC, chaired by the prime minister, convened only once every three months; this is the minimum required by law. Despite this, the NSC is also supposed to make decisions not only at the policy and strategic level, but also resolve issues at the operational and tactical level.
The infrequency of sessions versus the frequency of recurring issues has created a considerable backlog. It is evident here that there is a need to increase the frequency of convening NSC meetings. This is, in fact, already the case now after the movement control order was declared, but again, this was a reactive rather than a proactive measure.
Additionally, the lack of a clear national security strategy and policy can be seen in the lack of commonality across three major strategic documents: the Defence White Paper, which was agreed on in Parliament, New Foreign Policy Framework from the Foreign Ministry, and the Public Order and Safety Policy from the Home Ministry.
From these three documents, only the Defence White Paper has clarified Malaysia’s aspirations as a middle power and characterised Malaysia as a maritime nation with continental roots. The lack of consensus between these documents on the country’s aspiration and characterisation has effectively hindered our ability to strengthen cooperation in managing maritime security affairs.
Furthermore, the Defence White Paper is the only document that classifies threats based on priorities, as well as proposes holistic lines of effort to tackle these threats. Among them are the “Great Power” competition in the South China Sea, cyber electromagnetic activities, the use of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological explosives, and piracy and smuggling in Malaysia’s main maritime areas, such as the Sulu Sea and Straits of Malacca. There is clearly a need to streamline these documents at the NSC level, so that each of these threats is given the proper attention and credence.
It is all the more important now that such a streamlining occurs, given the “Great Power” competition that is brewing right in our front yard, the South China Sea. The whole world has its eyes focused on the South China Sea, and we must ensure that our nation is able to rise to the challenge in a precise and integrated way. The Defence Ministry, Home Ministry, Foreign Ministry, Communications and Multimedia Ministry, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency and other related departments need to stand together under the NSC in this effort.
It should be stressed here again that it is important to enhance the NSC’s role as a coordinator of national security strategy and policy. There is a need to appoint a national security adviser with ministerial rank who specialises in this policy space. Alternatively, a minister in the cabinet could also be given this responsibility.
The adviser/minister would be responsible for ensuring a single national security strategy and policy is prepared, as well as leading the efforts to streamline all other subordinate policies in this common strategy. Such a streamlining is needed so that every agency receives the correct recognition for its role, and the resources required to perform that role. It will also reduce the overlap between the areas of responsibility of each agency and ministry, in effect, clarifying the missions expected of each security and enforcement body.
With this, it is hoped that the discourse surrounding our national security will be able to transcend the typically superficial boundaries under which it has laboured for so long. Given the circumstances, there is a need to expand our views to encompass more than our currently limited understanding of national security. – The Vibes, October 2, 2020
This speech was delivered by former deputy defence minister Liew Chin Tong in the Dewan Negara on September 23, 2020
