A NARRATIVE advanced by a Bersatu-linked thinker suggesting that PAS’s present strength stems primarily from its alliance with Bersatu warrants closer scrutiny against historical facts, particularly the party’s experience in the 2004 general election, according to political analyst Dr Mukhtaruddin Musa.
On PAS’s political trajectory, Mukhtaruddin cautions against simplistic readings of history that risk distorting both the party’s past defeats and the future prospects of Perikatan Nasional (PN).
He argues that portraying PAS’s poor performance in the 2004 polls as the result of having “no coalition partners” is factually inaccurate and ignores the broader political context of the time.
He notes that claims linking the collapse of the Barisan Alternatif (BA) to PAS’s announcement of its Islamic State Document are chronologically incorrect.
DAP withdrew from BA in 2001, while the document was only unveiled on 12 November 2003, when PAS was still under the leadership of the late Datuk Fadzil Noor. Associating BA’s breakdown with a policy document introduced two years later, he says, reflects a basic historical error.
Rather than weakening PAS, he argues that the episode illustrated the party’s longstanding commitment to principle, a trait that has often been misinterpreted by allies and critics alike.
Mukhtaruddin further disputes the assertion that PAS went into the 2004 election alone.
While DAP exited BA in September 2001, PAS continued cooperating with Parti Keadilan Nasional and Parti Rakyat Malaysia, which later merged to form Parti Keadilan Rakyat in August 2003.
That political cooperation, he notes, remained intact through the 2004 and 2008 general elections.
He contends that PAS’s heavy losses in 2004 were instead driven by a major national political shift following Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s resignation as prime minister on 31 October 2003.
His successor, Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, presented a reformist and moderate image that restored confidence among Malay voters and softened the “Malay revolt” sentiment that had fuelled opposition gains in 1999.
The psychological reset among voters, combined with Barisan Nasional’s structural advantages such as electoral redelineation, created a vastly different political landscape in which PAS faced a rejuvenated opponent rather than a collapse caused by isolation.
Against this backdrop, Mukhtaruddin argues that drawing parallels between PAS today and its 2004 defeat is misleading.
He stresses that PAS’s strong showing in the 15th general election cannot be reduced to “riding on” PN or its chairman Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin.
While PN provides the coalition framework, PAS contributes organisational strength, disciplined machinery and a deeply rooted grassroots network that commands voter confidence.
He also addresses tensions within PN, particularly in Perlis, cautioning against framing the issue as one of loyalty to the palace.
Instead, he identifies weaknesses in coalition crisis management, including the failure to resolve disputes through PN’s Supreme Council and the absence of firm disciplinary action over unilateral moves by Bersatu assemblymen.
Such governance failures, he warns, undermine the credibility of the entire coalition and affect all component parties, including PAS.
Mukhtaruddin, who is Head of Research (Governance and Policy) at Yayasan Strategik Lestari and a political observer, dismisses claims that PAS intends to abandon coalition politics, noting that no PAS leader has indicated a desire to leave PN.
The party’s criticism, he says, centres on the need to strengthen PN’s structure, discipline and collective leadership so that internal disputes do not erode public confidence.
Similarly, he argues that PAS’s call for reforms in PN’s leadership structure, including its stance on the coalition chairmanship, is an institutional demand aimed at improving functionality, not an individual quest for power.
Looking ahead to the 16th general election, Dr Mukhtaruddin says PN’s prospects are not as uncertain as some suggest.
He cautions against overinterpreting by-election results, which are often shaped by local dynamics, and points instead to broader political currents, including persistent voter dissatisfaction with both Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Harapan.
He added that history should serve as guidance, not a tool for fearmongering.
PAS, he argues, did not lose in 2004 because it lacked allies, but because of a national leadership transition that temporarily revived confidence in BN.
The task now is not to misapply historical analogies, but to build PN into a more coherent, disciplined and credible coalition capable of convincing voters it is ready to govern. - January 1, 2026
