KUALA LUMPUR – As the world focuses warily on China’s moves to dominate and militarise the South China Sea, tensions simmering in the Strait of Malacca which risks becoming another flashpoint have been largely overlooked.
The waterway, with its narrowest point measuring only 2.8 km wide, is an important conduit for China to connect its naval and trading fleets to the Indian Ocean.
It is also an ideal choke-point for China’s opponents to exploit to keep the superpower in check.
A naval blockade could cause a major disruption in international trade and bring economic ruin. Nearly 100,000 ships carrying a trillion dollars in trade travel through it every year.
Named ‘The Malacca Dilemma’ in 2003 by then Chinese president Hu Jintao, the scenario here is well recognised by Beijing which is working out strategies to meet its ambitions on this side of Asia.
String of pearls
According to the ‘string of pearls’ theory, China is establishing a chain of overseas outposts through which it can extend its sphere of influence. From Hainan Island and the disputed Paracels in the South China Sea, it stretches its mark all the way to eastern Africa where it has a naval facility in Djibouti.
Naturally, this is geopolitically worrying to India. Of particular interest to India are the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the overland China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.
In the case of the former, the massive port complex was funded by Beijing and built by two Chinese companies. Originally intended to be operated by Sri Lanka, it incurred heavy losses and was eventually leased to China for 99 years.
While a previous Sri Lankan government had given assurances that the port was purely civilian in nature, the election last November of president Gotabaya Rajapaksa possibly throws that into question.
He enjoys strong diplomatic and economic support from China, a relationship dating back to when his brother Mahinda was president.
Meanwhile, Pakistan – a major ally of Beijing due to the mutual enmity with India – is on the receiving end of tens of billions of dollars in Chinese infrastructure funding. The investment is part of a long-term goal of circumventing the Strait of Malacca via a land route.
These plans are in one way or another affiliated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the pet project of current Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
India’s security moves
India for its part, has a growing military presence in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, near the northern entrance to the strait. Though just a sliver of India’s territory, the islands allow it to keep watch over a confluence of trade routes.
While India’s navy is numerically inferior to the Chinese navy, it counts itself a member of the informal Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), alongside the US, Australia and Japan.
The four countries plan to carry out the latest iteration of Exercise Malabar – which Australia will join for the first time since 2007 – in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal in the near future.
Each of the four countries has a different reason for wanting to counter China, be it economic, military, diplomatic or some combination of those.
India is also flexing its soft power resources, though it lacks the financial resources that China is able to muster. Towards that end, India is financing a US$120 million (RM498.5 million) port in Sittwe, Myanmar.
It has also been working with Iran to develop a port there, however, the reimposition of UN sanctions on the latter has undermined that plan. India’s close ties to Israel, particular the purchasing of weapons, also complicates matters.
Closer to home
In Thailand, the perennially discussed canal along the Isthmus of Kra that would allow trade to bypass the strait is seemingly a non-starter right now. The current political turmoil in that country and the economic uncertainty from Covid-19 limit any possible progress.
Indonesia provides its own alternatives to the Strait of Malacca, namely Sunda and Lombok straits. The former path is mostly unnavigable by large cargo ships, while the latter can be traversed by ships that are too big for the Strait of Malacca.
On a geopolitical level, Indonesia has stressed its position as a non-claimant in South China Sea disputes, though it tries to play it safe by not picking sides between the US and China.
Recently it became public that the US government had lodged numerous requests to base its maritime surveillance aircraft in the country, only to be rebuffed by Jakarta.
Domestically, the tumultuous political reality of the previous two-and-a-half years has led to a back-and-forth recalibration of the relationship with China.
The Malaysian government under former prime minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak had inked a number of favorable deals with Beijing. These deals were in the billions of ringgit and were not exactly subject to the most rigorous oversight.
Most significant to the strait was the Melaka Gateway project which the Najib administration agreed to develop as a joint venture between Malaysia and China. Costing more than RM40 billion, it constituted the creation of a new port and artificial islands.
There has been much anxiety from various quarters about how China would take advantage of this vital foothold along the Strait of Malacca to exert its expansionist agenda.
Then when the Pakatan Harapan government swept into power in May 2018, it paused several projects, including the High Speed Railway and rewrote deals like the East Coast Rail Link.
They had originally mooted outright cancellation of some deals, however, too much money had already been spent and the ink had dried on the contracts, to the point that reneging on them would be too costly.
As the current government has ruled all but entirely under the shadow of Covid-19 and a resulting tough economic outlook, it has looked to China for assistance. Beijing is also leveraging its development of a vaccine as a way to improve relations around the region.
For the near-term China will have to depend on the strait as its economic lifeline. No side is really interested in a shooting war, and the logistics of a naval blockade are easier said than done.
Perhaps more importantly, China’s use of soft power through the BRI and vaccine diplomacy will be enough to sway countries stuck in the middle, especially in a pandemic-ridden world where budgets are tight and foreign investment has been significantly reduced. – The Vibes, October 31, 2020
