By Professor James Chin
AS Sabah hurtles toward its 17th state election this Nov 29, the air in Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan and Tawau crackles with the familiar rhythm of political manoeuvring – billboards sprouting like mushrooms, coffee shop debates escalating over ‘kopi’, and whispers of alliances shifting.
But amid the cacophony of marginalisation by federal encroachments, Sabah for Sabahans ideology and economic gripes, one demographic quietly holds the scales – the Chinese community.
Comprising a modest slice of the electorate, Sabah’s Chinese voters are poised once again to play a balancing role that has defined their political legacy.
In a State Assembly of 73 seats, where razor-thin margins can birth or bury governments, their choices could determine whether the incumbent Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) clings to power or cedes ground to a resurgent Parti Warisan or a coalition led by STAR.
Let’s start with the electoral calculus.
Sabah’s total registered voters stand at approximately 1.8 million, a slight uptick from the 1.1 million in the 2020 snap polls, reflecting youth enfranchisement and population growth.
Of these, the Chinese community accounts for around 190,000 voters; less than 20 per cent of the total voters.
Chinese voters dominate outright in about eight urban and semi-urban seats, including Luyang, Likas, Inanam, Kepayan, Api-Api and Karamunting in Kota Kinabalu; Elopura and Tanjung Papat in Sandakan; and Sri Tanjong in Tawau.
Here, their turnout, historically hovering at 70 per cent, can deliver victories or defeats.
Beyond these strongholds, they can tip the balance in another 13 constituencies where they form about 20 to 30 per cent of the electorate, and given they are more consistent voters, they are actually worth more than the 20 to 30 per cent official count.
In total, there are 20 seats, where a unified Chinese bloc vote can decide who can form the next government.
But the reality is that, like all other communities in Sabah, the Chinese are not wholly united.
In my opinion, most of the core Chinese seats will still go to the Democratic Action Party (DAP), but the other seats are up for grabs.
In recent history, some people called the Chinese voters the Kingmakers when there is a big fight between the KDMR and the Muslim bloc.
This can be traced back to the state’s turbulent post-1963 integration into the federation of Malaysia.
In the 1970s, as Sabah grappled with the scars of Konfrontasi and the dominance of Tun Mustapha’s United Sabah National Organisation (Usno) (the present Usno is a totally different party), a Muslim-heavy party rooted in southern Filipino ties, the Chinese community coalesced around Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (Berjaya).
Founded in 1975 as a multiracial bulwark against Usno’s open bias toward Muslim illegal immigrants, Berjaya promised equitable development and federal goodwill. It was led by Tun Fuad Stephens, the first Huguan Siou, who was popular with the Chinese community.
Chinese voters delivered Berjaya a sweeping victory in the 1976 state election, ousting Usno and installing Stephens as chief minister.
But Stephens never had a chance. He died in the Double-Six plane crash.
Harris Salleh, a Muslim with Pakistani heritage, suddenly became chief minister.
At the start of the Berjaya administration, its emphasis on education and infrastructure resonated with Chinese aspirations for stability in a nascent Malaysia.
By the mid-1980s, however, disillusionment set in.
Berjaya’s strong pro-federal tilt (symbolised by giving Labuan island to Kuala Lumpur) alienated non-Muslims and sections of the Chinese community.
It did not help that Harris became increasingly authoritarian.
Enter Tan Sri Joseph Pairin Kitingan’s Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), a KDM-led insurgency championing Sabah’s autonomy under the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), and promising that non-Muslims would be treated fairly.
In the 1985 and 1986 state elections, Chinese voters swung en masse to PBS, viewing it as a native ally against Berjaya and Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Dr Mahathir had promised that the federal government would ‘sink or swim’ with Harris Salleh.
The Chinese were especially spooked by bombings in downtown Kota Kinabalu after the 1985 polls, fearing a total breakdown and declaration of emergency rule by Kuala Lumpur.
Chinese business did not like civil disturbance. It was bad for business and bad for society.
Hence in 1986, they backed PBS solidly.
Pairin Kitingan courted Sabahans with pledges of indigenous cultural preservation and economic inclusion, securing landmark support that kept Sabah in non-Muslim hands for nearly a decade.
This era solidified a pattern: Chinese Sabahans as change agents, leveraging their economic clout, dominating commerce in Sandakan’s timber trade and Kota Kinabalu’s retail hubs, to back multiracial coalitions that tempered KDM nationalism with moderation.
The 1994 state election shattered this unity, marking a pivotal fracture in Chinese voting patterns.
The PBS, riven by internal schisms and Kuala Lumpur’s interference, faced a resurgent Barisan Nasional (BN). Although PBS won the 1994 state election, Kuala Lumpur engineered mass defections and Chinese support splintered.
Many in the Chinese community had been unhappy with the bad economy, imposed by Kuala Lumpur’s ‘political recession’ during the 1990-1994 period.
Yong Teck Lee, then-deputy chief minister under Pairin Kitingan, left just prior to the state election and formed SAPP.
The 1994 results showed a clear split among the Chinese.
The seven Chinese seats in 1994 were divided between PBS (four seats) and BN-SAPP (three seats).
The final nail for PBS was when all the senior PBS KDM left: Jeffrey Kitingan, Joseph Kurup and Bernard Dompok.
From then on, Chinese cohesion eroded; post-1994 elections saw fragmented support, with some gravitating to BN for stability, others to opposition fragments like the DAP for ideological purity.
This bifurcation persists, a legacy of 1994’s ‘end of Kadazan unity’, where Chinese voters learned the perils of disunity in a zero-sum game. - October 18, 2025
James Chin is Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Tasmania; Principal Research Fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs (IIPA) in New Zealand; Senior Associate at the Tun Tan Cheng Lock Institute for Social Studies; and Adjunct Professor at Monash University.
This article first appeared in Borneo Post Online
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