KUALA LUMPUR – Electoral watchdog Bersih 2.0 has revealed that there are weaknesses in the Closed List Proportional Representation (CLPR) electoral system proposed by the Election Reforms Committee (ERC).
The CLPR system was mooted by ERC chairman Tan Sri Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahman as a tool to curb the incessant party hopping which has toppled several state governments as well as the Pakatan Harapan (PH) federal administration last year.
CLPR allows the political parties to directly contest in federal constituencies and those seats are locked on to the party instead of a Member of Parliament. Therefore, should an MP leave his or her party, the seat still remains with the party instead of the individual lawmaker.
The party president will then simply replace the errant MP with another candidate from his party from the list that the political organisation has already submitted to the Election Commission during nomination day in the last general election.
In a report commissioned by the non-governmental organisation (NGO) entitled “How to Deter Party Hopping in Malaysia? An exploration of remedies,” political scientist Professor Wong Chin Huat pointed out that the CLPR system can lead to party leaders becoming too powerful within their parties.
The academic explained that instead of completely replacing the First Past the Post (FPTP) system currently being implemented in Malaysia, Bersih 2.0 recommends a mixed system between CLPR and FPTP.
The ERC had actually recommended replacing the FPTP at federal level with the CLPR system while retaining the FPTP at state level elections.
“Instead of a complete replacement of FPTP with CLPR, we deliberately recommend retention of FPTP seats so that popular incumbents still stand a chance to get elected under FPTP even if they are dropped as candidates by party leaders.
“CLPR will leave party leaders with absolute power in deciding the sequence of candidates and may produce powerful parties that survive on communal support and suppress dissents within the party.
“In the worst scenario, such parties may form a solid cartel to monopolise and share executive power and disempower the legislature,” said Wong in his report.
“Mixing FPTP and CLPR may capture the best of both worlds under these two conditions: first, if the FPTP lawmakers are allowed to switch party but are subject to recalls (re-election); and, second, the portion of CLPR seats is large enough to reduce the prospect of government change by a few defections.
“Given Malaysia’s socio-political environment, pure CLPR may produce some parties with strong leaders, weak lawmakers and narrow identity base, potentially worse than now.”
He added on one hand, as party leaders can both control the order of candidates on the party list and hence their electability and terminate a lawmaker’s legislative career by expelling him or her from the party, such parties may develop personality cult rather than issue niches. This may make some voters further disillusioned with democracy.
“On the other hand, retaining FPTP constituencies while introducing CLPR in complement may encourage some moderation in identity politics through ‘interethnic vote pooling’ or ‘extensive intergroup bargaining’,” said Wong.-The Vibes, January 9, 2021
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